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profit-maximizing firms facing consumers with reference-dependent
preferences and loss aversion. We discuss the implications of loss
aversion on the practice of price discrimination, product differentiation,
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uncertainty.
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I. Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), a
large literature has emerged to document the importance of reference-
dependent preferences and loss aversion in economics. Evidence suggest
that loss aversion can account for diverse economic phenomena, ranging
from the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler 1995) to the seller
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behavior in a housing market (Genesove and Mayer 2001).1 In this
survey, we provide an overview of recent developments in the industrial
organization (IO) literature, which analyze the behavior of firms that serve
loss-averse consumers. We discuss the implications of consumer loss
aversion on the practice of price discrimination, product differentiation,
and incentive provision, among others.
The well-documented phenomenon known as the “endowment effect”
illustrates reference-dependence preferences. Many experimental and
survey studies have shown that the willingness to pay (WTP) of indi-
viduals is usually lower than their willingness to accept (WTA) for the
same object (e.g., Thaler 1980; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990).
This contrasts with the predictions of the standard economic theory,
which states that the two values should be equal. However, reference-
dependent preferences with asymmetric impact of losses are consistent
with the divergence between WTP and WTA: paying for a good that one
does not own incurs money loss and hence reduces WTP, whereas giving
up a good that one already owns leads to a physical loss and hence
increases WTA. A utility function that captures this wedge between WTP
and WTA adds to the standard “intrinsic utility” term a new “gain-loss
utility” term with respect to a reference point together with a loss aversion
parameter greater than one.
Despite the strong evidence in support of reference-dependent prefer-
ences, critics of this theory have pointed out the ad hoc treatment of
the determination of the reference point. They question whether the free-
dom to choose the exact specification of reference point (e.g., the status
quo, current wealth level) has been the driving force behind the sub-
stantial explanatory power the theory has gained. In recent years, how-
ever, a new breed of theoretical and empirical explorations of reference-
dependence preferences has emerged to offer some discipline and helped
advance the literature in a coherent manner.
A growing number of empirical studies have highlighted the specific
role played by expectations in the formation of reference points. By
directly manipulating the expectations of laboratory subjects, Abeler,
Falk, Götte, and Huffman (2011) and Ericson and Fuster (2011) showed
that the expectation on a random event influences how subjects behave
after the uncertainty is resolved. In a lab experiment, Gill and Prowse
(2012) found that expected monetary payoffs affect subjects’ effort pro-
vision in a competitive environment. Through field studies, researchers
1 See Camerer (2006) for a survey.
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have found evidence of the significant roles played by expectations as
references in various areas including professional golf games, taxi drivers’
labor supply, police officers’ performance, and domestic violence (e.g.,
Pope and Schweitzer 2011; Crawford and Meng 2011; Mas 2006; Card
and Dahl 2011). By contrast, a series of papers by Kőszegi and Rabin
(2006, 2007, 2009) proposed a rational expectations approach in which
the reference point is taken to be a stochastic distribution of actions/
outcomes.2
The results from various models of firm behavior that adopt the ex-
pectations approach to the reference-dependence preferences are
presented in this survey. While this unified approach allows us to offer
an organized overview of how consumer loss aversion affects profit-
maximizing firms, it is also important to note that many firm settings
are indeed natural grounds for expectations to come into play. Uncer-
tainty is a key ingredient of these situations. For example, when a firm
offers a menu of products to discriminate certain types of consumers,
the consumer may not yet know the full extent of his or her utility
function. Similarly, an incentive scheme designed to tackle a moral
hazard problem is usually presented to a worker prior to the realization
of uncertain outcomes. In these situations, it is plausible to think that
the agent evaluates the choices offered by the firm with respect to his
or her expectations about the uncertain future in some way.
A common theme is emerging from this new literature within IO.
Economic theories based on standard consumer preferences often pre-
scribe firm strategies that are rather complex and specify substantial
variations in outcomes to deal with different realizations of uncertainty.
A monopolist can improve profit by offering multiple product qualities and
prices to screen consumers with heterogeneous demands. Comparably,
a financial intermediary can encourage greater efforts from its borrowers
by designing a sophisticated payment scheme that depends on outcome
realizations. The main implication of consumer loss aversion is the limi-
tation imposed on the benefits from such complex practices when con-
sumers admit reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion.
In Section II, we introduce recent studies on price discrimination with
consumer loss aversion. This section is organized around a summary of
2 Another branch of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences was
previously proposed by Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986), Gul (1991), and
Shalev (2000). These models consider a fixed expectation as reference point. See
Sprenger (2011) for an experimental effort to distinguish between the two ap-
proaches.
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a recent paper by Hahn, Kim, Kim, and Lee (2014), which we borrow to
formally present how the decision model of Kőszegi and Rabin is applied
to a firm setting. We also offer the main intuitions behind the mechanism
of loss aversion that are applied broadly to other models of price dis-
crimination and beyond. In Section III, we turn to other firm settings in
which the effects of consumer loss aversion have been explored. Loss
aversion has been applied to other monopoly pricing models (without
the issue of screening), competition models with differentiated products,
and agency models with moral hazard, among others.
This survey is by no means exhaustive. In order to focus on the
issues related to optimal firm strategies against loss-averse consumers,
we had to leave out many interesting and relevant topics in which loss
aversion has been shown to generate meaningful new insights. Moreover,
the IO literature on loss-averse consumers is awaiting answers to a
host of outstanding questions (e.g., Ellison 2006). There are also other
“behavioral” approaches that can address well-known economic questions,
including the ones introduced in this survey. We refer interested readers
to Spiegler (2011) and Kőszegi (2013) for a treatment of broader sets of
issues and models in this burgeoning area of research. Finally, the in-
sights from these behavioral approaches are by no means meant to be
direct substitutes for existing economic theories based on the rational
agent paradigm. Rather, our understanding of the complex world may
well be best advanced by taking a more balanced and complementary
interpretation of all the findings.
II. Price Discrimination
When a firm faces consumers with heterogeneous levels of willingness
to pay, it can increase profit by offering multiple product types and
screening the consumers. However, recent papers have established that
the effectiveness of the practice of price discrimination is limited when
the consumers admit reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion.
The basic intuition is as follows. In the process of screening consumers
with reference-dependent preferences, some types of consumers would
purchase bundles that diverge from their reference point and as a result,
they experience an additional utility loss. Subsequently, such consumers
would find extra incentives to deviate from the bundles designed to screen
them, thereby tightening the incentive compatibility constraints that the
profit-maximizing firm needs to satisfy.
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As discussed in the Introduction, an important issue is how the con-
sumer's reference point is formulated. In a recent paper, Hahn, Kim,
Kim, and Lee (2014), henceforth referred to as HKKL, transformed the
expectation-based reference point model of K̈őszegi and Rabin (2006),
henceforth referred to as KR, into a standard screening model. Incor-
porated into the model are vertically differentiated demands for quality
based on Mussa and Rosen (1978). In this section, we employ the
analysis of HKKL to formally describe the KR model of reference-
dependent preferences and introduce the main intuitions behind the
process of consumer loss aversion that can be broadly applied to other
models of firm behavior.
A. The Model of Hahn, Kim, Kim, and Lee (2014)
Consider a monopoly facing a consumer with two possible types of
willingness to pay, q∈{qL, qH }, for its product of quality q. The monop-
olist's constant marginal cost of production is c＞0. The low willingness-
to-pay type is commonly known to occur with probability p.3
The consumer's utility function, given a “bundle” b＝(q, t) (where t
denotes transfer), consists of the sum of two parts.
First, the usual quasi-linear “intrinsic utility” is given by
m(b; q )＝q v(q)－t,
where v(․) satisfies the standard technical conditions.
Second, the consumer experiences a “gain-loss utility” with respect to
his or her ex ante expected consumption plan in each possible real-
ization of uncertainty q. Formally, let ri＝(qi
r, ti
r) denote the bundle that
the consumer expects to purchase if his or her type turns out to be q i,
i＝H, L. Given a collection of such expected consumption plans, that is,
reference point R＝{rL, rH }, type-q buyer’s gain-loss utility from b＝(q, t)
is given by










where m is an indicator function such that, for any k1, k2∈R＋,
3 HKKL goes beyond the binary demand type case and also analyzes the case
of a continuum of types.
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To clarify this formulation, consider for example the term m (qv(q)－
qL v(q
r
L)) in the RHS. This term represents type-q ’s gain-loss from consum-
ing quality q relative to qrL, the quality level that he or she would have
enjoyed under the realization qL; it is then weighted by the correspond-
ing prior probability p. The parameter l measures the degree of loss
aversion; l＞1 means that the buyer is loss averse, that is, from a given
difference from the reference point, the buyer feels an asymmetrically
larger loss than gain.
Given the reference point R (expected choices of bundles), a type-q
buyer’s overall utility from b＝(q, t) is then given by
u(b|q, R)＝m(b; q )＋n(b; q , R). (1)
The relative importance of gain-loss utility can also be adjusted by
multiplying the latter term in the LHS by some parameter. However, it
would be inappropriate to assume a value that is too large. Moreover,
following Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and Kőszegi and Rabin (2006),
the gain-loss utility is additively separable across the two consumption
dimensions, namely, quality and monetary transfer.
The situation depicted by this model can be summarized as follows.
The monopolist commits to a menu of bundles, to be referred to as M,
before the realization of uncertainty. The consumer observes the menu
and forms a reference point, which amounts to his or her expected
contingent actions. Once the consumer’s type is realized, he or she
chooses a bundle. It is also possible that the consumer does not make
a purchase at all, in which case the reservation utility is zero. The final
utility is given by Equation (1).
B. Personal Equilibrium
KR requires that the consumer's reference point consumption plan be
consistent with his or her actual choices; that is, the expectation should
be rational. We now introduce the notion of personal equilibrium proposed
by KR in the setup of HKKL. Let f denote the zero-zero bundle to
represent non-participation.
Definition 1. Given any menu M, R＝{ri }i＝H,L⊆M∪{f } is a personal
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equilibrium (PE) if
u(ri│q i, R)≥u(b│q i, R), ∀b∈M∪{f },∀i＝H, L. (2)
Furthermore, R＝{ri }i＝L,H is a truthful personal equilibrium (TPE) if it is a
PE given M＝R.
It is straightforward to apply the revelation principle here: any PE
can be equivalently represented by a TPE. In the case of a TPE, the
reference point itself is offered as a menu and therefore, each type only
needs to prefer its choice of bundle over the other type's bundle or the
null bundle. Then, the requirements of PE in (2) can be interpreted as
the following incentive compatibility (IC) and (ex post) individual ratio-
nality (IR) constraints:
u(ri│q i, R)≥u(r－i│q i, R) (IC)
u(ri│q i, R)≥u(f│q i, R). (IR)
There are several things to note in the above definition. First, this
adaptation of KR assumes that, although a priori the reference bundles
may come from anywhere (e.g., a product offered by another competing
firm), the consumer’s reference point is essentially generated within the
given menu.4 Second, the monopolist commits to a menu ex ante, and
no further introduction of products is made after, which can additionally
influence the consumer’s expectation. Third, there may in fact be multiple
personal equilibria in a given menu. KR also proposes a refinement of
PE: a preferred personal equilibrium (PPE) is the PE that yields the
highest ex ante expected utility to the consumer.5
C. Optimal Menu under Consumer Loss Aversion
The optimal menu in the above model with standard preferences entails
price discrimination to screen the consumer with high willingness to
pay. HKKL demonstrate that with reference-dependent preferences and
loss aversion, additional costs of screening surface and the standard
practice of price discrimination become dominated by other contractual
4 A related concept of contextual reference prices has been put forward in the
marketing literature. See Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha (2005) for a review.
5 The analysis of HKKL considers both PE and PPE as solution concept. It
turns out that the qualitative results are similar under both concepts.
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forms if the consumer is sufficiently loss averse.
Consumer loss aversion creates two new forces at work. First, when
the consumer purchases a bundle ex post, he or she compares the
resulting utility with the utility that would result from opting out. The
gain-loss utility of this comparison results in the consumer experiencing
a loss on quality and a gain in money. Therefore, faced with a loss-
averse consumer, the monopolist can squeeze more profit out of the type
whose participation constraint is binding by offering a higher quality
product. Similar to the case of the standard screening problem, it is the
consumer with low demand for quality to whom this participation effect
applies.
Second, for the consumer who acquires an information rent (i.e., the
high willingness-to-pay type), deviation to a lower quality-price bundle
generates a complex gain-loss comparison effect in terms of quality and
money. In particular, the gain-loss comparison in this case is weighted
by the likelihood that the event does not happen. The high-demand
consumer would have purchased the cheaper bundle, had his or her
demand turned out to be a less quality-sensitive type. If the chance
that this event occurs increases, the impact of the gain-loss utility under
KR's expectation approach likewise increases.
These two effects indeed reinforce each other to limit the benefits of
price discrimination. On the one hand, the monopolist finds an additional
incentive to offer a higher quality and more expensive bundle to the
low-demand type consumer. On the other, the monopolist faces a more
challenging task to provide incentives for the high-demand type consumer
to separate himself or herself. The overall consequence is that when the
likelihood of low willingness-to-pay consumer is sufficiently large and
the degree of loss aversion lies in an intermediate range, the optimal
strategy of the monopolist is actually to offer a single product to accom-
modate both types of the consumer. With an excessively loss-averse con-
sumer, profit maximization is achieved by a reverse-screening menu in
which the low type is given a higher quality, more expensive product.6
The results of HKKL (and other related papers discussed below) provide
a useful new perspective on real life practices of price discrimination.
While a plausible account of coarse screening exists in the form of fixed
product costs (e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz 1977; Spence 1980), there are
6 This latter observation, however, is not robust in the model with continuous
types and also requires a degree of loss aversion that may well be too high.
Camerer (2006) summarizes various estimates on the loss aversion parameter.
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many instances where such frictions are not significant and yet the
firms’ product offerings only contain minimal variations. For example,
different seats in existing entertainment venues are associated with
different views and setting multiple seating categories incurs essentially
zero cost. Nonetheless, firms in these industries often choose limited
seating categories, or even opt for single ticket pricing. See the survey
by Courty (2000) as well as other related references in HKKL.
There are other related works of price discrimination with loss-averse
consumers in which the intuitions sketched above apply to generate
firm strategies that are simpler than those employed under standard
preferences.
Similar to the work of HKKL, the study of Herweg and Mierendorff
(2013) examined a monopolist facing a loss-averse consumer. They for-
mulated the consumer in the framework of KR (with the gain-loss utility
occurring only in the money dimension and not in the quality dimension),
but considered an alternative timeline in which the consumer commits
to a contract ex ante. For instance, a holiday maker who rents a car
does not know exactly how much he or she is going to use the car at the
time of rental. Restricting attention to two-part tariffs, the authors showed
that the monopolist may in fact want to set flat tariffs to maximize profits.
Another model of price discrimination with loss-averse consumers was
considered by Carbajal and Ely (2013). In contrast to the model of HKKL,
the seller in this model offers a menu to a consumer, who already knows
his or her type and admits any arbitrary contingent consumption plan
as a reference point. This approach, among others, allowed the authors
to demonstrate how the form of the optimal menu depends on the shape
of the reference point itself. Similar to HKKL however, loss aversion in
this model creates an additional downward distortion in the optimal
quality levels of high consumer types.
III. Pricing, Competition, and Incentives
A. Pricing
Price stickiness is one of the most widely noted phenomena in macro-
economics. The leading theory explains the phenomenon as a situation
where non-trivial fixed costs (also called “menu cost”) prevent firms from
continuously changing prices. Models incorporating consumer loss aver-
sion propose an alternative possibility: loss-averse consumers are first-
order averse to risks and therefore, fluctuations in price reduce con-
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sumers’ welfare, which in turn lower consumers’ willingness to buy the
product. Thus, profit-maximizing firms have incentives to charge stable
prices, even when production costs are fluctuating.
Heidhues and Kőszegi (2005) considered a monopolist faced with loss-
averse consumers and uncertain cost of production, and showed that it
is optimal for the monopolist to assign one price for the different real-
izations of production cost. More specifically, even when the probability
distribution of the cost is continuous, the optimal distribution of prices
is discrete under certain assumptions. This result is due to the mon-
opolist’s effort to reduce consumers’ sense of loss that comes from the
comparison between the price they pay and the one they would have
paid. By reformulating the main ideas of Heidhues and Kőszegi (2005)
and Kőszegi and Rabin (2006), Spiegler (2012) managed to provide a
simplified model (a “cover version”), which generates qualitatively identical
results. In addition to price rigidity, he showed a couple of new effects
of loss aversion on monopolist’s price. In particular, his model predicts
that the average price is lower under loss aversion because consumers’
willingness to pay is lower on average. He also showed that the price is
more likely to be sticky when the uncertainty is on the demand side
instead of on the production cost.
Eliaz and Spiegler (2013) incorporated the idea of sticky price due to
reference dependent utility into a dynamic model to explain wage stick-
iness and excessive volatility of the unemployment rate, which have been
the subject of lively debate among macroeconomists (e.g., Shimer 2005).
Eliaz and Spiegler (2013) showed that the introduction of reference de-
pendence in workers’ utilities to a game-theoretic search and matching
model creates endogenous downward rigidity in wage and increases the
volatility of the unemployment rate. In particular, they assumed that an
individual worker’s output declines when his wage stochastically drops
from its normal level (i.e., reference point) which is given as the lagged
expectation. In each period, firms face productivity shocks and make
one-period non-contingent take-it-or-leave-it offers. It was shown that
the wage is rigid within a match, but flexible for new matches, which is
qualitatively consistent with empirically observed patterns.
B. Competition
The papers introduced above considered either a monopoly seller or a
search market, which generates bilateral monopolies. The next step is
to investigate how loss aversion affects the behavior of firms under
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competition.
Heidhues and Kőszegi (2008) incorporated loss aversion to the other-
wise standard circular city model to demonstrate that under certain
conditions, competitors who have asymmetric production costs may
charge a symmetric price, labeled as “focal price.” A key feature of the
model is the initial lack of ideas of consumers with regard to which
product they will like the most and as such, the consumers formulate
a contingent plan, which serves as the reference in latter stages of the
game. A consumer ends up comparing the purchase made with all the
other deals that he or she would have made. If a firm charges a price
higher than those of its rivals, a decrease in demand would be dispro-
portionately large because consumers feel an additional sense of loss in
the money dimension, whereas an increase in demand due to a price
cut would be relatively small. Heidhues and Kőszegi (2008) showed that
whenever consumers are sufficiently loss averse, a focal equilibrium
exists in which all firms set the same price in spite of the differences in
production cost.
Building upon Heidhues and Kőszegi (2008), Karle and Peitz (2014)
examined the effect of consumer loss aversion on the intensity of com-
petition between horizontally differentiated firms. In particular, they as-
sumed that some consumers have perfect information about their ideal
products and so experience neither gain nor loss when buying a product,
whereas the others are not aware of their best matches and hence
admit gain-loss utilities depending on the realization of the “match value.”
It was shown that when firms are symmetric in terms of production
efficiency, the equilibrium profit monotonically decreases in the share of
informed consumers. This observation implies that consumer loss aver-
sion relaxes price competition. In asymmetric duopoly, however, the
overall effect on price competition depends on the size of the difference
in the production cost. When the cost difference is sufficiently large, the
markups for both firms are lower in the presence of consumer loss
aversion than in its absence. This ambiguity comes from the fact that
consumers can experience gain and loss at the same time in the dif-
ferent dimensions. The loss aversion in price dimension plays a pro-
competitive role, whereas that in product dimension plays an anti-
competitive role. Thus, when the asymmetry in the market share is
expected to be sufficiently large, the pro-competitive effect of loss aversion
in price dimension dominates that in product dimension, resulting in
lower markups in equilibrium. Analyzing a model with exogenous refer-
ence point, Zhou (2011) also showed that loss aversion in price dimension
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intensifies competition, whereas loss aversion in product dimension soft-
ens competition.
C. Incentive Provision
Another area of firm decision making concerns the problem of provid-
ing incentives for its employees whose actions are private information.
In contrast to adverse selection settings in which complete removal of
differentiation is often optimal, a contract that is completely unrespon-
sive to the realizations of uncertainty could not solve the moral hazard
problem even with a loss-averse agent. In such situations, firms would
offer a contract that responds to the performance of its employees less
finely than the optimal contract without worker loss aversion.
De Meza and Webb (2007) and Herweg, Müller, and Weinschenk
(2010) characterized the optimal wage contract for loss-averse workers.
Because variations in payment reduce the expected value of the con-
tract and generate a loss when the realized wage falls short of the ref-
erence wage, the firm has to provide a high baseline wage to implement
a strong incentive scheme. Herweg, Müller, and Weinschenk (2010)
showed that if the worker's reference point is created by his rational
expectation, the optimal contract has only two possible wage levels
(“bonus structure”) under certain conditions. By contrast, De Meza and
Webb (2007) considered the case where the reference point is the cer-
tainty equivalent of the expectation as in Gul (1991), and showed that
the payment is flat for a range near the reference point. If the reference
point is the median wage, then the optimal compensation is unrespon-
sive up to the reference point, and increases thereafter (“option-like”
compensation scheme). Macera (2012) studied a repeated moral hazard
model with the agent's loss aversion. Results showed that in the dynamic
setting, the optimal compensation may be completely unresponsive to
the performance of the current period.
IV. Conclusion
In this survey, we attempted to introduce recent literature on firm
behavior under loss-averse consumers whose utilities depend on their
expectations as reference point. In the presence of uncertainty, a profit-
maximizing firm in the standard models has incentives to adopt strategies
that prescribe different outcomes for different realizations of uncertainty.
Consumer loss aversion limits the benefits of such complex behavior.
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An important feature of the models discussed in this survey is the
presence of exogenous uncertainty. Even in setups without such uncer-
tainty, the expectation-based approach to reference-dependent preferences
can deliver interesting new insights. In contrast to the papers that il-
lustrated firms’ incentives to provide insurance against stochastic loss,
those of Heidhues and Kőszegi (2014) and Rosato (2013) examined whether
firms have incentives to introduce uncertainties into deterministic en-
vironments to exploit the feeling of loss that would arise from not buying
a product. Loss aversion has also been applied to a number of settings
beyond the firm context. For instance, Eisenhuth (2010) considered auc-
tions with loss-averse bidders, and Grillo (2013) introduced a loss-averse
receiver into a cheap talk game.
The literature on applications of loss-averse agents is still at its early
stages, and numerous relevant questions remain. For example, most of
the existing models do not consider dynamic interactions between firms
and consumers. The effects of consumer loss aversion on the outcomes
of dynamic models, such as the profitability of collusion, the design of
durable goods, and the incentive provision for innovation, are some of
the interesting topics in this direction. The role of worker loss aversion
in organizations and labor markets is another potential topic for further
investigation. In particular, re-analyzing standard labor market models
of career concerns or tournaments could lead to fruitful new insights.
Finally, loss aversion of investors is believed to be relevant in financial
markets. However, formal analysis of its impact has been limited thus
far. How firms should distribute dividends to loss-averse investors and
how security issuers can optimally structure financial products are just
a few interesting directions for future research in this area.
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